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Abstract 
As a contemporary universalist, Jürgen Habermas appropriates Kant’s practical 
philosophy. He insists, however, that no cultural difference may be disrespected in 
the name of universalism. Rather, only those moral norms that are accepted by 
every participant, regardless of their cultural background, of a rational-moral 
debate are universal. My aim, in this paper, is to show that Habermasian 
universalism is not co-tenable with the cultural differences he endeavors to 
incorporate into his Kantian paradigm. In order to reach my aim, I shall, first, 
review Habermasian discourse ethics. In the second section, I shall focus on the 
history of sexuality to test the tenability of Habermasian universalism.  
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Habermas ve Evrenselcilik Çıkmazı 
 
Özet 
Evrenselciliğin çağdaş temsilcilerinden Jürgen Habermas, söylem-etik kuramını 
Kant’ın ahlak felsefesi üzerine kurar. Bununla birlikte Habermas, evrenselcilik 
adına hiçbir kültürel farklılığın dışlanmaması gerektigini savunur. Dolayısıyla, 
ancak ve ancak rasyonel-ahlaki tartışmanın tüm katılımcıları tarafından kabul 
edilen normların evrensel normlar olabileceğini söyler. Bu yazıda Kant felsefesi 
üzerine kurulan Habermasçı evrenselcilik ile kültürel farklılıkların bir arada var 




Ahlaki Bilişselcilik, Söylem Etiği, İletişim, Eşcinsellik, Kültürel Farklılıklar.  
 
I 
Habermas calls any moral theory which does not take moral questions to be the 
subject of rational-critical debate a product of the “pathology of modern consciousness” 
(Habermas 1990: 45). In other words, he condemns any non-cognitivist moral theory 
such as positivism, emotivism, or decisionism. He believes that no positivistic theory 
which reduces moral questions to two other questions, i.e. “What do I want to do? And 
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How can I do it,” is capable of giving an account of our everyday moral feelings (Ibid., 
49). For we feel guilt or indignation when the moral norms we hold are transgressed. 
That is, we take moral norms to be intersubjectively binding, but not to be the subject of 
purposive rationality. On the other hand, Habermas continues, since cognitivist moral 
theories accept moral norms as “fact[s] of reason,” they can account for the binding-
character of moral norms (Habermas 2003: 239). 
Defending his cognitivist stance, Habermas follows a formalist tradition of Kant. 
He works on a principle which makes rational-moral argumentation and rational-moral 
agreement possible. The principle Habermas appeals to is the Principle of Universality 
(U-principle). To wit, a norm is valid if it is impartial and universally acceptable; or, as 
Habermas puts it, if “[a]ll affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its 
general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s 
interests” (Habemas 1990: 65). However, Habermasian universality test is different 
from Kant’s. For Habermas, it is not sufficient to test a norm individually and 
contemplate on the possibility of its being accepted by every rational-human being in 
order to find out if the norm in question is universalizable. Rather, what is required is a 
genuine moral argumentation by means of which it is possible to see if every participant 
of such a moral debate accepts the norm in question. 
Habermas calls such an argumentative interaction between diverse participants 
“communicative” if the participants arrive at an agreement or “consensus” on the 
validity of the norm discussed (Ibid., 57). If a norm proposed by a participant can resist 
every attempt to invalidate it, and thus, be accepted by every participant, then it is a 
valid norm. However, an argumentation process is not genuine, and an agreement 
reached in this process does not validate any norm “[i]f those affected are excluded, 
certain topics suppressed, relevant contributions disregarded, evident interests not 
sincerely articulated or convincingly formulated, if others are not respected in their 
otherness” (Habermas 2003: 259). 
Moreover, in a genuine argumentation process, every participant has to defend 
her claim by some rational arguments “that could convince anyone irrespective of time 
or place” (Habermas 1995: 52). That is, Habermas believes that rational arguments must 
seem rational to every participant of a moral debate regardless of whether these 
participants belong to the similar or different cultures. Thus, for him, it is possible and 
also required to find a “single right answer” in moral debates since moral norms are 
universal and categorical (Habermas 2003: 260). Searching for a single answer, 
Habermas presupposes a “single social world that includes all claims and persons” 
(Ibid.). However, this world is not the objective world to be discovered. Rather, an 
intersubjective and intercultural world must be created by the participants of a moral 
dispute through “mutually taking one another’s perspectives” (Ibid.).  
The idea of taking other’s perspective is in accordance with Habermas’ U-
principle, since what make a norm valid are not subjective life-stories or culturally 
exclusive values, but rational argumentation process and consensus between all of the 
participants. What this means is that, for Habermas, moral norms may be validated just 
by objective and rational arguments. In the process of moral validation, the lifeworld of 
the participants must be left behind. As Habermas puts it, “[m]oral-practical 
Habermas and the Impasse of Universalism 




discourses… require a break with all of the unquestioned truths of an established, 
concrete ethical life, in addition to distancing oneself from the context of life with 
which one’s identity is inextricably interwoven” (Habermas 1995: 12).  
However, one question comes to mind immediately: Is it possible for participants 
of an argumentation process to reach consensus or universal norms in the age of 
“pluralism of ultimate value orientations” (Habermas 1990: 76). How can Habermas 
answer skeptical concerns regarding the universality of moral norms? Similar to his 
appropriation of Kantian universality test, Habermas also appropriates Kant’s 
transcendental idealism. He tries to show that both the universalist and the skeptic must 
accept some transcendental conditions of communication. These conditions are not 
relative to different cultures, but they are unavoidable for any communicative action to 
take place. Thus, his “discourse ethics” 
attempts to show that the meaning of the basic principle of morality can be 
explicated in terms of the content of the unavoidable presuppositions of an 
argumentative practice that can be pursued only in common with others. The 
moral point of view from which we can judge practical questions impartially is 
indeed open to different interpretations. But because it is grounded in the 
communicative structure of rational discourse as such, we cannot simply dispose 
of it at will. It forces itself intuitively on anyone who is at all open to this 
reflective form of communicative action (Habermas 1995: 1).  
Among others, the most important condition of a genuine communication is that 
no relevant argument, objection, and participant may be excluded from an 
argumentation process. If, for example, a skeptic communicates with a universalist to 
convince the latter that there is no universal norm, she, for Habermas, must presuppose 
such transcendental conditions. Accordingly, the validity or the invalidity of a norm 
cannot be agreed upon by either party if they do not accept the Principle of 
Universality.  
However, Habermasian universalism as it is described above has encountered 
with many criticisms. These criticisms are mostly based on the incommensurability of 
ethical values and on the impossibility of real individuals’ leaving their lifeworld 
behind. For example, Steven Lukes (1982) asks “[w]ho are the participants in the 
unconstrained discourse that is held to offer the possibility of rational consensus?” (p. 
141). If these participants are actual individuals, then there is no reason to suppose that 
real individuals would distance themselves from their traditional narratives, ethical 
values, or prejudices, so as to reach an agreement on a moral norm. Or as Albrecht 
Wellmer (1991) claims, in a non-ideal situation, we cannot have any universal 
agreement even on a basic maxim such as “Thou shalt not lie” since the consequence of 
such a universal norm would be severe for the suppressed than the suppressor in a non-
egalitarian society (p. 155). In other words, Habermas does not give any reason for 
having faith in a rational-moral consensus. On the other hand, if the participants in 
question are ideal participants in an ideal situation, then rational-moral consensus is not 
only possible, but also unavoidable “only because it has been so formulated that it must 
do so” (Lukes 1982: 140). In other words, such an ideal situation with ideal participants 
is just a theoretical construct not corresponding to reality. Furthermore, suppose that 
some rational participants are discussing the moral value of abortion, and suppose that 
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they are eager for taking every relevant aspect of the subject into account. In such a 
situation, there is again no reason to believe that there would be an agreement, since 
Habermas does not give any criterion to decide which aspects are relevant in 
determining universally valid norms. Moreover, in discussing the moral value of 
abortion, it seems quite difficult to find out which aspects are relevant without 
appealing to incommensurable “evaluative orientations,” i.e. if what is relevant is the 
sanctity or the quality of human life (Warnke 1995: 131).  
However, I claim, we should not limit ourselves to actual individuals within 
different cultures with incommensurable value orientations in evaluating the tenability 
of Habermasian universalism. We should also focus on real individuals within different 
scientific and ethical paradigms with incommensurable ways of reasoning to see if 
Habermasian universality is cotenable with cultural differences; and if it is possible to 
prevent every relevant aspect, every relevant argument, and every relevant participant 
from being excluded from an argumentation process if we hold Habermasian 
universalism. And against this background, we should find out if Habermas’ appeal to a 
sort of transcendental idealism can rescue his universalism. In this respect, I will review 
the history of sexuality in the next section. And since Habermas claims that rational 
arguments must be convincing irrespective of time and place in order to validate norms, 
I will focus on three different eras: Ancient Greece, late eighteenth century and the 
second half of the nineteenth century.  
 
II 
The Greeks did not conceptualize sexuality by means of the sexual-object 
chosen. They did not see any qualitative difference between a desire for girls and a 
desire for boys. Therefore, they did not classify sexual-desire into different kinds with 
special characteristics. As Michel Foucault (1992) states, “they believed that the same 
desire attached to anything that was desirable—boy or girl” (p. 192). Thus, they did not 
see the one who enjoyed boys as having a different nature from the one who enjoyed 
girls. Accordingly, they did not construct the concept of homosexuality as referring to 
peculiar desires, drives, inclinations, or character traits. Of course, “The Greeks were 
aware… that individuals differ in their sexual preferences,” although they had no term 
corresponding to homosexuality and heterosexuality (Dover 1989: 1). Yet, such 
preferences were regarded as matters of taste.  
Sexuality was conceptualized by means of the modality of sexual deeds. What 
this means is that what mattered for The Greeks was the dichotomy between activity 
and passivity, rather than psycho-sexual nature, implicit inclinations, or innate desires. 
Accordingly, the moral value of sexuality was not based on the nature and object of 
desire. But, first, it was based on the intensity of the sexual act. That is, what concerned 
The Greeks was moderation. One had to act on his desires in order to control them, in 
order not to be enslaved by them, in order to dominate them, and in order not to be 
passive in front of them. That is, one had to have mastery over his desires if he wants to 
act morally. Second, no active male member of the Greek society may accept the 
passive role in a sexual intercourse. For The Greeks saw an 
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isomorphism between sexual relations and social relations. What this means is 
that sexual relations—always conceived in terms of the model act penetration, 
assuming a polarity that opposed activity and passivity—were seen as being of the 
same type as the relationship between a superior and a subordinate, an individual 
who dominates and one who is dominated, one who commands and one who 
complies, one who vanquishes and one who is vanquished (Foucault 1992: 215). 
In this respect, one of the most important subjects of a moral debate on sexuality 
among The Greeks was whether boys as passive partners of a sexual intercourse were to 
be touched. For, as Foucault states, The Greeks “couldn’t accept that a young boy who 
was supposed to become a free citizen could be dominated and used as an object for 
someone’s pleasure” (Foucault 2000: 257). Hence, for any moral debate regarding the 
moral value of man-to-man sexual relationship, supposedly moral arguments based on 
the nature of the act (active penetration)—i.e. if such an act was natural when it is 
directed to boys—or based on the nature of desire—i.e. if being attracted to young boys 
without touching them was moral— had secondary, if any, importance. Even male-
prostitution was evaluated in terms of the dichotomy between activity and passivity, and 
in terms of the isomorphism between social relations and sexual relations. As Eva 
Cantarella (2002) points out, male-prostitution was not a breach of law per se, since 
performers were taxed. However, any male prostitute would lose his right to work as a 
priest, as an advocate for the state, as an officer, and as a speaker in assembly. For he 
was dominated; and he, as being passive object of someone’s desire, “made a woman of 
himself” (p. 46). In a similar way, any moral question regarding femininity would not 
accept any answer as relevant if the answer was based on the nature and the desire-
object of a pederast. Yet only those answers that were based on the modality of the 
deed, i.e. if performer was passive, if he was dominated by his or other’s desire, were 
relevant to a moral discussion. As a result, any moral question, argument, or objection 
regarding the nature of desires, pleasures, or inclinations would be irrelevant for the 
participants of a moral debate on man-to-man sexual relation.  
However, this does not mean that The Greek lifeworld was so pervasive that it 
determined the value of every moral question and argument, yet it could be left behind 
in order for scientific or objective reasoning to dominate the moral-practical discourse. 
For The Greek lifeworld was intertwined with scientific reasoning such that one’s 
elimination would be devastating for the other. For example, pseudo-Aristotle asked 
“[w]hy do some men enjoy sexual intercourse when they play an active part and some 
when they do not?” (Aristotle 2000: 26). Then, he gave a scientific explanation of the 
phenomenon: every “waste product” has a natural destination; for example, “semen 
passes into the testicles and privates,” and “blood into the veins” (Ibid.). And if the 
passages into the testicles are blocked, “such moisture flows into the fundament”—this 
is the reason why “the naturally effeminate” desires “friction” in that part of his body 
(Ibid.). In other words, even such a scientific explanation within the Aristotelian 
tradition was based on the dichotomy between activity and passivity, since the former 
was not problematized in pseudo-Aristotle’s text, and the latter was taken to be the sign 
of contemptible effeminacy.  
If we turn to the nineteenth century “style of reasoning,” we encounter with a 
completely different conceptualization of sexuality. In the second half of the nineteenth 
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century, sexuality was conceptualized by means of psychiatric terms such as “impulses, 
tastes, aptitudes, satisfactions, and psychic traits,” or tendencies to behave like a woman 
or man, to enjoy dressing like a woman or man as if these characteristics were naturally 
given (Davidson 2001: 35). This style of reasoning preconditions the possibility of 
conceptualizing homosexuality as the third sex containing peculiar desires, character 
traits, and a nature sui generis. It was impossible to conceptualize homosexuality as 
such before, since sexuality had been conceptualized, in the late eighteenth and the early 
nineteenth centuries, by means of anatomical terms. To wit, if, for example, sexual 
identity is defined by “spermatozoon,” such questions are totally meaningless: “Can a 
spermatozoon be heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual? Can it suffer from deviant 
sexuality, or abnormally increased or decreased sexuality? Can it have masochistic, 
sadistic, or fetishistic desires?” (Ibid., 38).  
Then it was this homosexuality as the third sex with a peculiar nature that has 
became the target of both moral-legal and scientific discussions on man-to-man sexual 
relationships in the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. Therefore, what 
pseudo-Aristotle explained about the nature of passive participant of pederasty was to 
be neglected and labeled as irrelevant, regardless of whether what pseudo-Aristotle said 
was empirical or speculative. For what pseudo-Aristotle referred to was not the 
homosexual of the nineteenth century with unconventional feelings and desires, but the 
passive boy with unconventional acts. To elaborate this point, I shall turn to two heroes 
of the nineteenth century conceptualization of homosexuality: Richard von Krafft-Ebing 
and Karl Heinrich Ulrichs. 
Krafft-Ebing is the nominator of the concepts of homosexuality, sadism, and 
masochism. He defines sexual identity by psychiatric terms as opposed to anatomical 
ones: “[t]he form of the sexual glands is therefore not the qualifying element of sex-
determination, but we must look rather to sexual sensations and the sexual instinct” 
(Krafft-Ebing 1924: 45), i.e. what matters are “psychical dispositions,” “sexual 
consciousness,” “psychical characteristics,” and sexual predilections (Ibid., 42). 
Defining sexual identity as such, he becomes potent to conceptualize homosexuality: 
homosexuality is a product of discrepancy between bodily constitution and psycho-
sexual identity. In Krafft-Ebing’s view, homosexuals have “the instinct of the female” 
with the opposite sex’s psycho-sexual characteristics (Ibid., 54). Since homosexuality 
refers to a kind of “psychical anomaly,” “[t]he determining factor [of homosexuality] 
here is the demonstration of perverse feeling for the same sex; not the proof of sexual 
acts with the same sex” (Ibid., 286). Therefore, sexual intercourse with boys without 
any desire for or inclination towards them is not sufficient to call one homosexual if the 
motivating factor of his act is, say, over-stimulated sexual hunger or shortage of women. 
This point is illustrated by Krafft-Ebing by means of some case studies. For example, in 
his Psychopatia Sexualis, Krafft-Ebing calls one of his patients homosexual, because 
when the patient was a child, he was playing with girls’ toys and enjoying toilettes; he is 
now jealous of women’s “quite manner” and chic; he has “woman’s disposition” since 
he is “tenacious,” “mild,” and “forgiving” (Ibid., 304-324). In another case study, 
Krafft-Ebing believes that his patient is homosexual although she has no sexual desire 
for women, because she prefers masculine sports, “intellectual conversation” rather than 
dancing or talking about jewelry or perfume—that shows that she has “the character of a 
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man” (Ibid., 324-328). As a result, any argument, moral or scientific, given by pseudo-
Aristotle, regarding man-to-man sexual relation, based on the act itself, would be 
irrelevant in any debate within the paradigm of Krafft-Ebing. For what was crucial for 
pseudo-Aristotle, i.e. homosexual act, did not concern Krafft-Ebing. Therefore, it would 
be unwise to expect a genuine communication between pseudo-Aristotle and Krafft-
Ebing which would end up with consensus. Rather, both of them would see each other’s 
arguments as irrelevant in discussing man-to-man sexual relationship.  
The problem of the relevancy of arguments in moral questions can be grasped 
more clearly if we turn to Ulrichs who was the first defender of homosexual rights in 
Germany. He fought for homosexual rights even in “the Congress of German Jurists” 
(Kennedy 1988: 89).  
Ulrichs conceptualizes sexuality by appealing to the myth narrated in Plato’s 
Symposium. He calls homosexuals Urnings—Urning corresponds to the elder 
Aphrodite, daughter of Uranus, without mother—and heterosexuals Diornings 
corresponding to the younger Aphrodite, daughter of Zeus and Dione. For Ulrichs, 
homosexuality refers to the third sex; it is a “special sexual class of people” (Ibid., 57). 
In Urnings, Ulrichs continues, “male germ” develops physically, but not spiritually—
that produces “uranian hermaphrodites” (Ibid., p. 51). Therefore, homosexuals are 
“women in spirit” (Ibid., 50). That is, belonging to the same paradigm with Krafft-
Ebing the psychiatrist, Ulrichs the social activist uses the same style of reasoning. 
Accordingly, for Ulrichs, one’s sexual preference and his character traits are parallel: 
“an Urning is a male in body, but a female in spirit,” he has “feminine characteristics,” 
and his love for a man is a love of woman (Ibid., 59). This does not mean that all 
Urnings display feminine characteristics without exception, but they are still women in 
spirit because “their inborn love for the male sex is precisely a female part” (Ibid., 72). 
In other words, love and desire are sexed as opposed to The Greek paradigm based on 
the modality of deeds. Therefore, as Krafft-Ebing, and as opposed to pseudo-Aristotle, 
Ulrichs devalues sexual acts in determining sexual identity. He accepts the existence of 
uranized men—those who have sex with boys due to the shortage of women—but for 
him, they are not genuine Urnings, since what matter are sexual inclinations, desires, 
and psycho-sexual characteristics. 
As a result, in the paradigm of Krafft-Ebing and Ulrichs, moral-legal arguments 
regarding homosexuality as the third sex, would not be about the moral value of an act 
performed, say, in a prison due to the shortage of women, or about the moral value of 
touching boys. Such arguments, which were crucial for The Greeks in discussing the 
morality of man-to-man sexual relations, would be totally irrelevant in the paradigm of 
the nineteenth century. Therefore, in a moral argumentation regarding the morality of 
homosexuality, pseudo-Aristotle would be excluded from an argumentation process if 
the goal of moral argumentation is Habermasian universalism, i.e. consensus, 
irrespective of time and place. On the other hand, since performers of man-to-man 
relationship are subsumed, by Krafft-Ebing and Ulrichs, under the category of the third 
sex as a peculiar class, what might count as a relevant argument would be about the 
naturalness of the feelings, desires, inclinations, and character traits of this class—the 
arguments which would be irrelevant for pseudo-Aristotle. Accordingly, Ulrichs’ 
arguments for homosexual rights are based on the naturalness of homosexual traits. As 
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we saw above, he explains homosexuality as a product of male germ’s twofold 
development. If homosexuality is a product of a natural process of development, then 
homosexuals do and feel and display what is natural to them. And since the nineteenth 
century laws ban only what is unnatural, homosexuals cannot be prosecuted (Ibid., 54-
68). 
However, Ulrichs’ argument would not seem as a relevant argument in the late 
eighteenth century, especially in the eyes of the opponents of Jeremy Bentham—
Montesquieu and Voltaire. As Bentham—writer of the first known text for homosexual 
law reform—testified, both himself and his opponents took man-to-man sexual 
relationship to be the subject of unconventional acts, not of desires and character traits. 
In other words, they problematized what was not problematical for Krafft-Ebing and 
Ulrichs who searched for homosexual desires, not for acts of an uranized man: 
That this practice is the result not of indifference to the proper object but of the 
difficulty of coming at the proper object, the offspring not of wantonness but of 
necessity, the consequence of the want of opportunity with the proper object, and 
the abundance of opportunity with such as are improper is a notion that seems 
warranted by the joint opinions of Montesquieu and Voltaire (Bentham 1978b: 
92). 
Therefore, they did not take pederasts to be the people of the third sex with 
peculiar desires, but the ones who turned to boys due to the shortage of women. 
Accordingly, showing that homosexual desires and corresponding effeminacy were 
natural was not a powerful evidence to persuade Montesquieu and Voltaire. For what 
mattered for them was not desires and character traits, but acts.  
Since Bentham and his contemporaries did not classify sexual desire into 
different kinds but took desire for boys to be the deviation of the same desire for girls, 
i.e. the desire for boys and the desire for girls were seen as one and the same desire, 
what was the most convincing argument for homosexual law reform was that 
homosexual act was not “exclusive of the other,” i.e. heterosexual act (Bentham 1978a: 
402). Bentham persistently argued that homosexuality could not become so prevalent 
that would cause women’s losing their social importance and domestic rights; and that 
even if it became so prevalent it could not destroy the divine institution of marriage:  
Were the prevalence of this taste to rise to ever so great a heighth the most 
considerable part of the motives to marriage would remain entire. In the first 
place, the desire of having children, in the next place the desire of forming 
alliances between families, thirdly the convenience of having a domestic 
companion whose company will continue to be agreeable throughout life (Ibid., 
400). 
What these words imply is that Bentham took pederasty to be a matter of taste. 
And he argued that there was no reason to prosecute this taste, since it was not 
dangerous to the society, and not exclusive of heterosexual marriages. Bentham’s 
argument was a relevant argument in the paradigm he belonged to. On the other hand, 
there is no reason to expect that Ulrichs’ naturalness-argument would be taken by 
Voltaire and Montesquieu to be a relevant moral-argument in discussing the moral 
value of man-to-man sexual relations.  
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Against this background, we can evaluate the tenability of Habermasian 
universalism. Habermas believes that individuals as members of society are not 
atomistic entities. They are located in a culture in which certain habits, institutions, 
rules, and value orientations are conventional. Individuals “move within the horizon of 
their common lifeworld; this remains in the background of the participants—as an 
intuitively known, unproblematic, and unanalyzable, holistic background” (Habermas 
1992: 298). This background allows individuals to follow or breach conventional rules 
which receive their meaning and truism thanks to the shared lifeworld. However, 
“[s]omeone who has not mastered the rules of a game and is not even capable of making 
mistakes is not a player” (Habermas 2003: 98). Therefore, if, as Habermas believes, 
moral norms require validation through a genuine argumentation process, and if the 
arguments used in this process have to be convincing and relevant arguments 
irrespective of time and place, then there is no reason to expect that most of the 
participants of a rational-practical discourse would not be labeled as non-players not 
knowing how to play. As I tried to show, pseudo-Aristotle is not a player in the game of 
the nineteenth century, and Ulrichs is not a player in the game of the eighteenth century. 
In other words, Habermas encounters with incommensurable cultural differences which 
contains not only incommensurable value orientations, but also diverse ways of 
reasoning with incommensurable rules of playing games. Habermas insists that if 
“relevant participants are excluded” and “relevant contributions suppressed,” we 
cannot validate norms universally, and we cannot have a genuine communication 
(Habermas 2003: 108). However, if his system is not capable of elaborating the criterion 
of relevancy and of including irrelevant participants into moral discussions, then there 
is no reason to believe in the universality of moral norms; and there is no reason to take 
Habermasian transcendental conditions of communication to be the sole and inevitable 
sources of genuine communication. That is, as Lyotard (1984) puts, there is no reason to 
accept Habermas’ presupposition: “the goal of dialogue is consensus” at the expense of 
eliminating cultural differences (p. 65).  
The reason why Habermas insists that we need a break with unquestioned 
cultural values at the expense of eliminating cultural differences and appeal to reason 
alone in order to reach what is universal is his belief that, in postconventional societies, 
“the intersubjectively shared worldview is shattered and the traditional form of life 
disintegrates” (Habermas 2003: 263). However, it is obvious that the world we live in 
contains traditionalist societies taking religious and traditional values to be the self-
confirming criteria in justifying moral norms. Therefore, Habermas has two options in 
the face of these societies. He can either reject that there are such societies by claiming 
that formalist-universalism, based on value-neutrality, is an ideal of all societies, or he 
can just decide that formalist-universalist ideal is the ideal we should stick to for some 
reasons we do not know why. 
Habermas does not pick the first option. For example, in the Structural 
Transformations of the Public Sphere, Habermas narrates the story of the bourgeois 
public sphere, preconditioned by liberalism, of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
Germany, England, and France. In this sphere, the ideal was “the law-based state, 
namely, the binding of all state activity to a system of norms legitimated by public 
opinion” (Habermas 1991: 82). Such a legitimation would occur if “the public 
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competition of private arguments came into being as the consensus about what was 
practically necessary in the interest of all” (Ibid., 83). And such a competition meant 
that “the authority of the better argument” had to prevail over the shared lifeworld, self-
affirming religious dogmas, state authority, and value orientations (Ibid., 36). 
However, if the goal is universalism, there is no justification for taking this ideal 
of liberalist bourgeoisie to be the sole source of justifying norms at the expense of 
leaving tradition and lifeworld behind. In other words, as Danilo Zolo (2009) claims, 
what Habermas does is to favor “juridical formalism, individualism and liberalism” as 
opposed to “order, social harmony, respect for authority, the family” (pp. 62, 67). And 
the latter, as well as the former, might be a source of justification; therefore, there is no 
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